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Barry Schermer: His Consumer Bankruptcy Greatest 
Hits 
 
Wendell J. Sherk and Kathy A. Surratt-States* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The following Article is an effort to encapsulate some of the more 
important consumer-related decisions rendered by Barry Schermer during 
his thirty-year tenure as bankruptcy judge.  It is not meant to cover all of 
his body of consumer work, much less provide an exhaustive study of the 
issues he has addressed.  Rather, it is a sampling of his more critical 
decisions that guide the day-to-day practice of bankruptcy law today. 
 
I. COPMAN & SECTION 109(G)(2) 
 
Can a person use repeated bankruptcy filings to thwart creditors or can 
creditors use a person’s mistaken effort to rebuild without filing 
bankruptcy against them?  These seemed to be the unappetizing 
alternatives facing the court in In re Copman.1 
Vicki Copman filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy in October 1992.  Soon 
thereafter, two secured creditors sought and were granted relief from the 
automatic stay in order to foreclose on their collateral.2  These motions 
were not opposed by Copman.3 
Subsequently in April 1993, Copman sought and was granted dismissal 
of her Chapter 13 proceeding.  Less than five months later, she again 
sought relief in Chapter 13.4 This time, an unsecured creditor, 
Southwestern Bell Company (SWB) asked the court to dismiss her case as 
a violation of section 109(g)(2).5 
 
 
* Wendell J. Sherk is a member of the Washington University School of Law Class of 1989 and 
has practiced bankruptcy law almost exclusively since 1990 in St. Louis, Missouri.  Kathy A. Surratt-
States is a member of the Washington University School of Law Class of 1991 and is currently Chief 
Judge of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.  Any opinions expressed 
herein are personal and do not represent the views of the court. 
1.  See 161 B.R. 821 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993). 
2.  Id. at 822. 
3.  Id. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 109(g)(2) (2012). 
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Section 109(g) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no 
individual or family farmer may be a debtor under this title 
who has been a debtor in a case pending under this title at 
any time in the preceding 180 days if . . .  
 
(2) the debtor requested and obtained the voluntary 
dismissal of the case following the filing of a request for 
relief from the automatic stay provided by section 362 of 
this title. 
 
Section 109(g)(2) is generally recognized to be a legislative effort to 
curb abuses of a debtor’s section 1307 absolute right to voluntarily dismiss 
a Chapter 13 proceeding and then to re-file bankruptcy in order to invoke 
the automatic stay, thwarting the efforts of creditors to pursue their rights.6  
By imposing a six-month moratorium on new filings, it would give 
conscientious creditors the opportunity to liquidate their collateral, for 
example. 
At the time Copman was litigated, there were three rather different 
approaches to interpreting section 109(g)(2)’s command to bar re-filings.7 
One simple reading provided that the 180-day bar was only invoked if the 
voluntary dismissal was sought while the motion for relief from the 
automatic stay was still pending before the court, in the prior case.8  As a 
motion for relief is often a relatively quick summary proceeding and a 
voluntary motion to dismiss is often considered and granted without a 
hearing at all, this interpretation rendered the 180-day bar a virtual nullity. 
Other courts took a mechanical approach — urged by SWB in Copman 
 
6.  In re Patton, 49 B.R. 587, 589 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1985) (“The 1978 amendments generally 
eased a debtor'[s] access to bankruptcy to avoid excessive indebtedness. Title II [sic] contains over 30 
substantive amendments to curb abuses of the bankruptcy code and make its use truly a last resort.”). 
7.  In re Copman, 161 B.R. 821, 822 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993) (“Section 109(g)(2), while 
seemingly unambiguous, is subject to several interpretations.”). 
8.  See, e.g., In re Patton, 49 B.R. 587 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1985); In re Milton, 82 B.R. 637 
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988). 
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— that provides that any voluntary dismissal occurring in a case where a 
motion for relief from stay had been filed at all would yield an automatic 
180-day bar on refiling.9  These courts treated the bar on re-filing as a 
virtually administrative act: if the prior case docket includes a motion for 
relief from the automatic stay then a bar is applied without further ado. 
At the polar opposite end, other courts have taken a discretionary 
approach, concluding that the bankruptcy court must investigate the 
underlying purpose of the dismissal to thwart abusive dismissals and re-
filings.10  In doing so, such courts attempt to discern whether the debtor’s 
goal is to “string out” a creditor seeking to foreclose on collateral without 
a meaningful intention (or perhaps ability) to reorganize under the 
protection of the bankruptcy court.11  Some of these courts found that a 
mechanical approach to enforcement, while possibly justified by a plain 
reading of the statute, would lead to absurd results where the debtor did 
not appear to be pursuing a strategy of delay in lieu of reorganization.12 
Judge Schermer declined to adopt any of these interpretive methods 
fully.  Instead, he focused more precisely on the language of the statute in 
an effort to square it with the seemingly narrow purpose intended by 
Congress.  He reasoned: 
 
Section 109(g)(2) applies if "the debtor requested and 
obtained the voluntary dismissal of the case following the 
filing of a request for relief . . ." (emphasis added). The 
word "following" in the statute requires some relationship 
between the timing of the [section] 362 request and the 
voluntary dismissal. Furthermore, by requiring that the 
debtor both "request" and "obtain" the dismissal after the 
request for relief, the statute requires a causal connection 
such that the request for relief triggers the dismissal. Had 
the statute been written to curb successive dismissals 
 
9.  See, e.g., In re Keziah, 46 B.R. 551 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985); In re Smith, 58 B.R. 603 (W.D. 
Pa. 1986). 
10.  In re Santana, 110 B.R. 819, 821 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990); see also In re Luna, 122 B.R. 
575 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991); In re Jones, 99 B.R. 412 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1989). 
11.  See, e.g., In re Santana, 110 B.R. at 821-22. 
12.  See, e.g., In re Luna, 122 B.R. 575 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991); In re Santana, 110 B.R. 819 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990); In re Jones, 99 B.R. 412 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1989). 
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generally, it would not have been so specific in requiring 
that both the request and the granting of dismissal follow 
the [section] 362 request. The plain language of [section] 
109(g)(2) thus applies when the request for relief from stay 
results in the debtor requesting and obtaining a voluntary 
dismissal of the bankruptcy proceeding.13  
 
By emphasizing the “causal connection” inherent in the language of 
section 109(g)(2), Schermer effectively synthesized the “mechanical” and 
the “discretionary” schools of thought.  Thus, under Copman the court is 
not simply acting in a ministerial capacity.  It must analyze whether 
dismissal of the prior case was related to the relief from stay motion.  But, 
if the court finds such a connection, then it has no discretion to allow the 
new case to continue.  On the other hand, where there is no such 
connection, as with Ms. Copman, then the court must allow the new case 
to proceed. 
II. SECURED CLAIM INTEREST IN CHAPTER 13 
 
Secured creditors — those holding a lien under non-bankruptcy law 
against property of the bankruptcy estate — are in a special position in 
Chapter 13 cases.  They are entitled to better treatment than general 
unsecured creditors as a consequence of their lienhold interest in the 
collateral.  In particular, they are entitled to have their contracts 
maintained,14 their collateral surrendered to them,15 or to be paid the 
present value of the collateral16 under a bankruptcy plan. 
Generally, paying the present value owed over time requires the 
payment of a “discount rate” (or, in laymen’s terms, “interest”) to 
compensate for the loss in time-value of money.17  The controversy is that 
the Bankrupcty Code does not identify how the court should determine 
this discount rate. 
In re Wilmsmeyer18 brought this dilemma to Judge Schermer’s 
 
13.  Copman, 161 B.R. at 823. 
14.  11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(2), (5) (2016). 
15.  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(c) (2016). 
16.  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2016). 
17.  See generally, Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 472-474 (1993). 
18.  171 B.R. 61 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994). 
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courtroom in 1994 with an added twist.  In Wilmsmeyer, the debtors 
sought to pay for their mobile home in deferred payments as part of the 
Chapter 13 plan at a lower rate of interest of 9.5% — provided in the 
bankruptcy court’s local rules — than the underlying contract rate of 
19.18%.19  The secured creditor objected and asserted that it was entitled 
to the contract rate of interest under section 506(b) because it was an 
oversecured creditor.20   
An “oversecured” creditor is one whose collateral exceeds the amount 
owed on the underlying loan obligation such that there is additional equity 
that, in such cases, may serve as additional protection for the creditor.21  
And, the Bankruptcy Code recognizes that oversecured creditors have 
additional protection from loss, as section 506(b) provides: 
 
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by 
property the value of which . . . is greater than the amount 
of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such 
claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, 
costs, or charges provided for under the agreement or state 
statute under which such claim arose. 
 
The Wilmsmeyers’ mobile home lender reasoned that section 506(b) 
required the debtors to pay “interest . . . provided for under the 
agreement[,]” rather than a lower rate designed simply to compensate for 
the time-value of money.22  Indeed, the mobile home creditor could point 
to powerful authority in that the Supreme Court had concluded that under 
section 506(b), “[r]ecovery of postpetition interest is unqualified.”23 
However, the bankruptcy court had recently received more precise 
guidance on section 506(b) from the Supreme Court.  In Rake v. Wade,24 
the Supreme Court noted that this provision provided interest only during 
the period between the date of filing and the confirmation of a plan.25 
 
19.  In re Wilmsmeyer, 171 B.R. 61, 62 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994). 
20.  Id. 
21.  U.S. v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). 
22.  In re Bell, 171 B.R. 61, 62 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994). 
23.  Id. at 241. 
24.  508 U.S. 464 (1993). 
25.  Id. at 468. 
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While this resolved the dispute in favor of the creditor for the narrow 
period of time when a Chapter 13 case was pending but a plan was not 
approved by the court, the applicable post-confirmation discount rate 
required by section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) — which applied to all secured 
claims whether under or oversecured — remained unresolved. 
The creditor next argued that the court was bound by the Eighth Circuit 
decision, In re Monnier Brothers.26 The Monniers Brothers case involved 
the analogous Chapter 11 provision to an oversecured claim.27.  In that 
case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals approved the use of the interest 
rate in the underlying contract.28 
Judge Schermer rejected the argument that Monnier Brothers dictated 
the use of contract rate generally.29  He pointed out that the circuit panel 
had concluded on appeal that the district court had not erred in relying on 
the underlying contract because the debtor, when advocating for a lower 
rate, had failed to provide any evidence of an alternative rate that reflected 
the statutory requirements.30  Failing to find evidence to support any other 
rate, the lower court was not incorrect to rely on the arm’s-length 
negotiation that gave rise to the contract rate.31  
Instead, Judge Schermer found that Monnier Brothers stood for the 
proposition that the discount rate in Chapter 13 must reflect the time value 
of the claim plus a risk factor adjustment to compensate for risk factors 
like the quality of the collateral and risk of default.32  Noting that the 
underlying contract provided for not only those compensations, but a 
handsome profit margin, Judge Schermer concluded that the “local rule 
rate” was appropriate which was originally derived from the same factors 
announced in Monnier Brothers.33 
A decade later, the Wilmsmeyer approach was vindicated when a 
plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that essentially the same 
“coerced loan” formula incorporated in local rules was presumptively an 
 
26.  755 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1985). 
27.  Id.; and see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2010). 
28.  In re Monniers Bros., 755 F.2d at 1339. 
29.  In re Wilmsmeyer, 171 B.R. 61,64 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994). 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. at 64. 
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appropriate discount rate, not the original contract interest rate bargained 
for between the parties.34  The dissent argued for a contract rate 
presumption; Justice Thomas concurred, reasoning that, while the statute 
only required a risk-free time-value of money discount rate and did not 
compel adjustment for any risk factors, it did not prevent the use of a 
higher rate either.35 
Only two years later, following congressional action in passing 
systemic amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, Judge Schermer was 
confronted with essentially the same issue all over again.  In 2005, 
Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA).36  One element of BAPCPA was a provision, commonly 
referred to as the “hanging paragraph” because it appears in an 
unnumbered paragraph immediately following section 1325(a)(9), which 
states:  
 
Section 506 shall not apply to a claim described in that 
paragraph if the creditor has a purchase money security 
interest securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, 
the debt was incurred within the 910-day period preceding 
the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for 
that debt consists of a motor vehicle . . . acquired for the 
personal use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt 
consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was 
incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing.37 
 
The “hanging paragraph” prevents a court from confirming a Chapter 13 
plan that attempts to modify the value of a secured claim to the value of 
the underlying collateral pursuant to section 1325(b)(5) — otherwise 
referred to as “cramdown” — if the underlying collateral meets specific 
qualifications.  Essentially, the “hanging paragraph” compelled the 
payment of the full amount owed under a contract entered into during 
relatively recent periods. 
 
34.  See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
35.  Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
36.  Pub. L. No. 109-8, 118 Stat. 23. 
37.  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9) (2012). 
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In re Fleming consisted of a consolidation of cases in which the same 
issue was presented to Judges Schermer and Surratt-States (the co-author 
here): When the “hanging paragraph” applies, is the debtor compelled to 
propose a plan that provides for the contract rate of interest instead of the 
so-called Till, or local rule, rate?38 
The less-than-ideal statutory construction of the amendments 
complicated In re Fleming’s issue.  While the “hanging paragraph” took 
away the tool used to “cramdown” the value of an allowed secured claim 
to the value of the underlying collateral — section 506(a) — and other 
BAPCPA provisions protected such creditors39 the statutory amendments 
did not change the language of section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).  And, as noted 
above, this provision had been read in Till to reject the underlying contract 
rate as the required discount rate in a Chapter 13 plan.40   
Further, BAPCPA did not amend the Bankruptcy Code’s provision 
allowing the debtor to propose a plan that modifies a creditor’s contractual 
rights.  Section 1322(b)(2) provides that the Chapter 13 plan may: 
 
Modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than 
a claim secured only by a security interest in real property 
that is the debtor’s principal residence, or of holders of 
unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders 
of any class of claims.41 
 
This left intact the right of the debtor to “modify” the secured creditor’s 
contractual rights, which typically include the amount and timing of 
payments as well as the interest rate.  And BAPCPA did not alter section 
502(b)(2), which provides that a creditor’s claim may not include 
“unmatured” (or post-petition) interest, if challenged.   
Thus, while BAPCPA had attempted to provide a dramatic increase in 
the recovery paid to certain secured creditors in Chapter 13, the court 
 
38.  339 B.R. 716 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2006). 
39.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i) (2016) (allowing lender to retain lien until full contract 
paid off or Chapter 13 discharge is granted); 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(B)(iii) (2016) (stating that periodic 
payments must provide “adequate protection”). This was particularly true for automobile lenders in the 
case of In re Fleming. 
40.  See Till, 541 U.S. at 277-78. 
41.  11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2012). 
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concluded that the core provision addressing the post-confirmation 
discount rate afforded such claims remained unchanged, therefore the Till 
formula approach also remained intact.42 
 
III. JUNIOR MORTGAGE LIEN STRIP-OFF 
 
Home mortgages often hold special rights within the bankruptcy 
process.  For consumer purposes, the most critical of these is the anti-
modification right embedded in section 1322(b)(2): 
 
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the 
plan may . . .  
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other 
than a claim secured only by a security interest in real 
property that is the debtor’s principal residence, or of 
holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights 
of holders of any class of claims (emphasis added).43 
 
The exact contours of the anti-modification provision are a heavily-
litigated issue, but in general, the provision stands for the proposition that, 
while the contractual or non-bankruptcy rights of a creditor are subject to 
change or “modification” in a Chapter 13 plan, those of a home mortgage 
lender are not.   
On the other hand, the anti-modification provision itself is loaded with 
terms of art that are otherwise defined in the Bankruptcy Code.44  For 
example, the protection extends to the holder of a “security interest” in a 
residence but not the holder of a non-consensual lien therein, as may occur 
with a judgment.45   
Importantly, the phrase “a claim secured by a security interest”46 
implicates section 506’s definition of a “secured claim” by defining a 
 
42.  In re Fleming, 339 B.R. 716, 724 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2006). 
43.  11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
44.  See, e.g. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (“claim”); 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (“secured claim”); and 
11U.S.C. § 101(51) (“security interest”). 
45.  Compare, 11 U.S.C. § 101(51) (“security interest”), with 11 U.S.C. § 101(36) (“judicial 
lien”). 
46.  11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). 
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claim as secured only to the extent of the value of collateral securing the 
obligation.  In 1993, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify one aspect of 
section 506’s limitation on the extent of a secured claim in the anti-
modification language of section 1322(b)(2).  In Nobelman v. American 
Savings Bank,47 the Court concluded that a Chapter 13 plan may not seek 
to “cramdown,” or modify, a claim that is undersecured by a security 
interest in the residence of the debtor.48  The debtor could not attempt to 
treat the “in the money” portion of the loan — the portion for which there 
is sufficient equity in the property to satisfy the debt — differently than 
the part that lacked equity value underlying it.49  In a critical part, the 
Court said it would, 
 
read "a claim secured only by a [homestead lien]" as 
referring to the lienholder's entire claim, including both the 
secured and the unsecured components of the claim. 
Indeed, [section] 506(a) itself uses the phrase "claim . . . 
secured by a lien" to encompass both portions of an 
undersecured claim.50 
 
But, in 1994, Judge Schermer was confronted with a factual twist on the 
Nobelman scenario:  What happens if the home mortgage is completely 
unsecured?51  In re Mitchell52 involved an elderly woman whose home was 
worth less than the debt owed on her first mortgage and statutory liens.53  
Despite this, there was a second mortgage against her home in favor of 
Green Tree Financial Corporation (Green Tree) as well.54  She sought to 
treat Green Tree’s claim as a general unsecured claim, to be paid pennies 
on the dollar, with her personal liability discharged and the recorded lien 
removed (that is, “stripped off”) at the conclusion of her Chapter 13 plan.55 
Green Tree naturally opposed this and argued that Nobelman controlled 
 
47.  508 U.S. 324 (1993). 
48.  Id. at 331. 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. 
51.  This scenario occurs most typically with “home equity” and junior, or second, mortgages. 
52.  177 B.R. 900 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994). 
53.  Id. at 901. 
54.  Id. at 902. 
55.  Id. at 901. 
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the outcome of the case.  While it acknowledged that its loan was entirely 
unsecured under section 506(a), Green Tree pointed to the Supreme 
Court’s instruction that the anti-modification provision applied to “both 
the secured and unsecured components of the claim.”56 
Ms. Mitchell was not the first debtor to pursue this strategy.  Courts 
within the Eighth Circuit had concluded before and after Nobelman that 
the analysis should focus on the type of claimant — a creditor with a 
residential mortgage — and the section 506(a) determination of secured 
versus unsecured status was irrelevant.57  An oversecured or undersecured 
or completely unsecured consensual mortgage interest was protected.58 
Judge Schermer concluded that such an extension of Nobelman from 
undersecured claims to totally unsecured claims (that happen to be for a 
home mortgage) was unwarranted.59  He pointed out that Nobelman only 
interpreted the specific language of section 1322(b)(2) in the context of a 
different factual scenario.60  Nobelman’s creditor indisputably held a 
secured claim as well as an unsecured claim; as such, it was covered by 
the exception to the general rule allowing modification of a claimant’s 
rights.  In Mitchell, the creditor was not the “holder” of “a secured claim” 
at all.  Its lien, at the time of filing, attached to no value in the property.  
Therefore, the creditor was only the holder of an unsecured claim in 
bankruptcy and section 1322(b)(2)’s clear language does not protect the 
rights of a holder of an unsecured claim from modification.61 
Under the Mitchell logic, the rights of a junior mortgagee often hinge 
on valuation of the collateral property and senior liens.  If only one dollar 
of equity exists after deducting senior liens, the mortgagee’s rights are 
sacrosanct.  If they are a dollar short, they are treated no better than an 
unsecured handshake loan between neighbors. 
At the time, Mitchell was not the first case to reach this conclusion.  A 
handful of other bankruptcy courts outside the Eighth Circuit provided 
 
56.  Id. 
57.  In re Mitchell, 177 B.R. 900, 901 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994) citing Nobleman 508 U.S. 324, 331 
(1993). 
58.  See, e.g., In re Hussman, 133 B.R. 490 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991); In re Hughes, 402 B.R. 325 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2009).  
59.  Mitchell, 177 B.R. at 902. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. 
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precedent in favor of Judge Schermer’s conclusion.62  But, no higher court 
had agreed. Within the Eighth Circuit, the bankruptcy judges of the 
District of Minnesota reached the opposite conclusion and the split 
remained unresolved.63 
Following Mitchell, however, Judge Schermer’s opinion has been 
adopted by every circuit court that has had occasion to review the matter.64  
This situation did not resolve the split within the Eighth Circuit as its 
circuit court had never confronted the issue. 
In 2011, the situation came to a head when the District of Minnesota 
ruled that a debtor could not “strip off” his unsecured junior mortgage lien 
in Chapter 13.65  To add a unique twist to the case, Mr. Fisette was not 
seeking to discharge his personal liability on the mortgage because he had, 
in fact, previously done so in a recent Chapter 7 proceeding.66  In fact, 
pursuant to section 1328(f)(1), Mr. Fisette would not be entitled to a 
discharge at all at the conclusion of a successful Chapter 13 plan.  
Mr. Fisette appealed this decision to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 
(BAP) for the Eighth Circuit.67  The appellate panel, in an opinion written 
by Judge Schermer, reaffirmed the conclusion he first reached in the 
Mitchell case: that Nobelman did not hinder the modification of a fully 
unsecured mortgagee’s rights.68  As the BAP pointed out, “the Nobelman 
Court did not examine the rights protected by §1322(b)(2) until after it 
established that the creditor held a secured claim.”69  At this point, the 
BAP could rely on unanimous support in appellate authority for this 
proposition.70 
 
62.  See, e.g.,In re Plouffe, 157 B.R. 198 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1993); In re Williams, 161 B.R. 27 
(Bankr. E.D. Ky.1993); In re Lee, 161 B.R. 271 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993); In re Sette, 164 B.R. 453 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
63.  In re Hussman, 133 B.R. 490, 491-493 (Bankr.D.Minn. 1991); In re Hughes, 402 B.R. 325, 
326 (Bankr.D.Minn. 2009). 
64.  See, In re MacDonald, 205 F.3d. 606 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 
2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); In re Pond, 252 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2001); In re 
Lane, 280 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002). 
65.  In re Fisette, 455 B.R. 177, 180 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011). 
66.  Id. at 179. 
67.  Id. 
68.  Id. at 177. 
69.  Id. at 183. 
70.  In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Lane, 280 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2002); In re 
Pond, 252 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2001); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); In re Bartee, 212 
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Beyond an opportunity to reaffirm Mitchell, however, Fisette presented 
the more hotly-debated issue of what would happen in such “strip-off” 
scenarios where the debtor was not entitled to a discharge at the successful 
completion of the repayment plan.  Fisette represents a relatively routine 
phenomena, colloquially referred to as a “Chapter 20 case,” in which the 
debtor has previously obtained a discharge under Chapter 7 and later seeks 
relief in Chapter 13 to address either new financial issues or those which 
remain unresolved after the completion of Chapter 7.  Due to the timing of 
the second case, the debtor would not be entitled to a discharge of any debt 
in this proceeding.71 
In a typical recourse mortgage, the lender has the right to collect on its 
claim via two distinct rights: A recourse contract may be collected from 
the individual debtor as a personal obligation — the in personam liability 
— and from the property pledged as collateral for the loan — the in rem 
liability.72 As in Fisette, the debtor may use a Chapter 7 discharge to 
eliminate his personal liability on a mortgage obligation pursuant to 
section 524.  But, the discharge injunction alone does not eliminate the in 
rem liability — the lienhold interest in the property — owed to the 
lender.73 In essence, the property continues to owe the debt while the 
individual does not. 
The Supreme Court in Johnson v. Home State Bank held unanimously 
that this in rem liability of the debtor’s property is a “claim” in a Chapter 
13 proceeding that may be addressed in a plan.74  Johnson has no wisdom 
to impart on the merits of unsecured junior mortgage strip-offs, much less 
where no discharge may be granted at the conclusion. 
For many courts, the “no-discharge Chapter 20 strip-off” is a bridge too 
far.75  In lay terms, the consumer bankruptcy discharge is traditionally the 
signature mark of finality to the process.  Although there is much more to 
 
F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Griffey, 335 B.R. 166 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2005); In re Mann, 249 B.R. 831(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000). 
71.  The debtor was barred from receiving a discharge in this case as it had been filed within four-
years of receiving a discharge in a prior Chapter 7 case. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(1). 
72.  Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991). 
73.  11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2010). 
74.  501 U.S. 78 (1991). 
75.  In re Victorio, 454 B.R. (Bankr. S. D. Cal. 2011); In re Gerardin, 447 B.R. 342 (Bankr. S. D. 
Fla. 2011); In re Fenn, 428 B.R. 494 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 2010); In re Jarvis, 390 B.R. 600 (Bankr. C. D. 
Ill. 2008). 
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the process than the discharge order, and it is possible to obtain many 
benefits from bankruptcy without a discharge, it represents the iconic 
“fresh start” that the consumer seeks in filing bankruptcy.   
In general, if a debt is not discharged, then the collection of it is merely 
delayed during the pendency of the bankruptcy case.76  By allowing a no-
discharge plan to still eliminate a mortgage lien upon completion amounts 
to a “[de facto] discharge” of the in rem liability.77 In particular, the 
Chapter 13 trustee in Fisette raised section 1325(a)(5) as an impediment.78  
This section provides, in pertinent part: 
 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall 
confirm a plan if — 
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided 
for by the plan—  
(B)(i) the plan provides that—  
(I) the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such 
claim until the earlier of—  
(aa) the payment of the underlying debt determined under 
nonbankruptcy law; or 
(bb) discharge under section 1328. 
 
Under this argument, the debtor could not confirm a plan that failed to 
provide for the creditor to “retain the lien securing the claim” until either 
the claim was paid in full under the contract or a discharge was granted.  
As neither was proposed, the plan could not be confirmed.   
The Fisette panel concluded that this argument failed to give effect to 
all the words of the provision in that the creditor must hold “an allowed 
secured claim.”79  As they pointed out, Nobelman held that the bank was 
the holder of a secured claim “because petitioner’s home retain[ed] 
$23,500 of value as collateral.”80  It also relied on the analysis of the 
Eighth Circuit in Harmon v. U.S.,81 where the court reviewed the 
 
76.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). 
77.  See, e.g., In re Fenn, 428 B.R. 494, 500 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010). 
78.  In re Fisette, 455 B.R. 177,185-186 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011). 
79.  Id. at 183. 
80.  Id. at 186 (quoting Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 329). 
81.  101 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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application of the same term “allowed secured claim” in section 
1225(a)(5).  The Harmon court taught as well that the definition of a 
secure claim must be found by referring “to the bifurcation of claims into 
secured and unsecure claims by section 506(a).”82 
In Fisette, the court concluded by critiquing the conceptual framework 
that found that such a strip-off proceeding was tantamount to a discharge 
and therefore should not be approved.83  The Bankruptcy Code itself 
defines the limitation created by a recent prior case in section 1328(f)(1), 
where a Chapter 20 debtor’s right to an in personam discharge is limited.84   
But, none of the other provisions of Chapter 13 were restricted.  In 
particular, the Bankruptcy Code does not limit the section 1322(b)(2) 
power to modify the rights of the holder of a fully unsecured claim.85  
Thus the court would not read into the Bankruptcy Code new restrictions 
that Congress had not created. 
 
IV. THE LONG SAGA:  STUDENT LOAN ISSUES 
 
Judge Schermer has been particularly active and influential in the case 
of student loan hardship discharge appeals.  Section 523(a)(8) allows a 
debtor to discharge student loan obligations if the debtor demonstrates that 
remaining liable for the loan will “impose an undue hardship on the debtor 
and the debtor’s dependents.”86  
The Bankruptcy Code does not define “undue hardship” in this context, 
leaving the courts to define the term.87  The Eighth Circuit has outlined a 
“totality of circumstances” test for determining undue hardship.  The test 
requires the court to take into consideration: (1) the debtor’s past, present, 
and reasonably reliable future financial resources; (2) calculate the 
debtor’s and the debtor’s dependent’s reasonable and necessary living 
expenses; and (3) any other relevant facts and circumstances surrounding 
 
82.  Fisette, 455 B.R. at 186 (quoting Harmon, 101 F.3d at 583). 
83.  Id. at 186-187. 
84.  A Chapter 13 debtor may not be granted a discharge if the debtor has previously been granted 
a discharge in a Chapter 7 proceeding filed within four years.  11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(1). 
85.  Fisette, 455 B.R. at 186. 
86.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1978). 
87.  In re Reynolds, 425 F.3d 526, 531 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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the particular bankruptcy case.88  
In one notable case, Judge Schermer succeeded in converting his initial 
dissent into the majority opinion after further appeal and remand from the 
circuit court.89 Nanci Long filed bankruptcy in 2000 and sought, and 
received, a declaration that approximately $35,323.00 in consolidated 
student loans was an undue hardship.90  Ms. Long was supporting her 
daughter on approximately $14,000.00 in annual income and suffered 
from mental health issues, which she testified limited her ability to seek 
higher income employment.91  The student loan creditor argued that she 
would qualify for a $54.00 monthly payment at her existing income level, 
under an Income Contingent Repayment Plan (ICRP) under the William 
D. Ford Loan Consolidation program, which could lead to the cancellation 
of any further indebtedness after twenty-five years.92  Ms. Long admitted 
she was aware of the ICRP option but argued that she had paid for over ten 
years on the loan until she could not continue to pay and needed more 
relief than what was offered under the ICRP.93  The bankruptcy court, 
although anticipating that Ms. Long “will ultimately get herself out of this 
unfortunate situation,” granted the hardship discharge because it was 
“highly unlikely that in the foreseeable future she is going to earn the kind 
of money that would ever be able to begin to dig herself out of these . . . 
loans.”94  This was particularly true in light of the non-dischargeability of 
other loans governed by an even more stringent standard.95  The creditor 
appealed.96    
On appeal, the creditor argued that the BAP should apply a de novo 
 
88.  In re Andrews, 661 F.2d 702 (8th Cir.1981); In re Andresen, 232 B.R. 127 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
1999).  The Andrews test conflicts with the more common Brunner test in that Brunner takes into 
account prior payment history on the student loan obligations in the good faith of the request for undue 
hardship determination. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
89.  In re Long, 271 B.R. 322 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2002). 
90.  Id. At 325-329. 
91.  Id. at 332. 
92.  Id. at 327. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Id. at 328. 
95.  Id. at 326-330.  Discharge of Health Education Assistance Loans (HEAL) is governed by 42 
U.S.C. § 294f(g), which, among other things, requires a finding that nondischarge would be 
“unconscionable.” U.S. v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1582 (7th Cir. 1991). 
96.  In re Long, 271 B.R. 322, 326–30 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter “Long I”]. 
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review of the facts of the case and that the lower court had clearly erred in 
finding an undue hardship.97  The BAP majority declined to apply a 
different review standard; instead, pursuant to prior decisions, it applied a 
more deferential “clearly erroneous” standard.98 The BAP went on to 
conclude it would “not go over [the debtor’s] expenses dollar for dollar 
but rather agreed with the lower court that the debtor lived modestly, had 
reduced her expenses significantly and ultimately they could not find clear 
error in the lower court’s conclusion that her expenses were reasonable.”99 
Judge Schermer dissented.  His protest focused on the undisputed fact 
that the debtor would qualify for a $54.00 per month payment under the 
ICRP option, with forgiveness of the indebtedness after 25 years.  He 
found that the record “amply” supported debtor’s ability to pay $54.00 per 
month.100 
This dissent references Judge Schermer’s dissent in the Cline case from 
two years previously.101  In Cline,102 a similar scenario in which an 
extended repayment program would have yielded a $283.00 per month 
payment on over $53,522.00 of consolidated student loans used to obtain 
both a bachelor’s and a master’s degree.103  The repayment program would 
extend for thirty-five years.104  The majority panel had concluded that “this 
is a case that could be determined either way.”105  The majority found that 
her budget could yield as much as $320.00 per month sufficient to afford 
the reduced payment option.106  Nevertheless, the majority declined to 
delve into the budget morass of examining her spending “dollar for dollar” 
and found that the lower court was not clearly erroneous in determining 
that the debt constituted an undue hardship.107 
While agreeing with the majority in Cline that the review standard 
encompassed only clear error by the trial judge, Judge Schermer 
 
97.  Id. at 328. 
98.  Id. at 328. 
99.  Id. at 331-32. 
100. Id. at 332. 
101. Id. 
102. In re Cline, 248 B.R. 347 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000). 
103. Id. at 353-54. 
104. Id. at 352. 
105. Id. at 349. 
106. Id. at 351. 
107. Id. at 353-54. 
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concluded that such a review did indeed require a nearly dollar for dollar 
re-examination of the budget.108  In part this was warranted because the 
lower court had failed to review the debtor’s paystubs, which showed the 
filed budget may have understated the debtor’s net income by almost 
$296.00,109 which would leave her with $240.00 month available to pay 
the loans.  In addition, he identified several expenses — $30.00 for cable, 
$50.00 for recreation and $25.00 for charity contributions — which Ms. 
Cline could eliminate from her budget.110  In doing so, in addition to the 
$240.00, it generated sufficient disposable income to fund the reduced 
payment option.111 
In Cline, the trial court found that the debtor was employed as a social 
worker for a state agency earning approximately $25,000.00 annually.112  
The debtor had sought and obtained higher paying jobs within the 
government, but testified that the additional stress caused by the greater 
responsibilities caused her to voluntarily return to the lower-paying job.113  
The trial court concluded that the debtor was unable to perform tasks 
beyond minimal, repetitive jobs.114 The BAP majority concluded that the 
trial court had applied the proper test: it had the opportunity to consider 
the candor and demeanor of witnesses and it “did not let Cline win an 
undue hardship discharge because she voluntarily limited her earning 
capacity.  Instead, the court found that the [sic] Cline was unable to 
maintain a job that paid higher income.”115 
Judge Schermer argued instead that the debtor voluntarily limited her 
income and therefore should not receive an undue hardship discharge.  
Pointing out that she had not been diagnosed with learning or other 
disabilities, he held, “[t]he [d]ebtor is uncomfortable in a job other than 
one requiring simple repetitive tasks, and therefore has voluntarily left 
several jobs which did not fall within her self-imposed comfort level.”116  
He went on to argue that the debtor had failed to take any other steps to 
 
108. Id. at 352. 
109. Id.  
110. Id. at 354. 
111. Id.  
112. Id. at 348. 
113. Id. at 349. 
114. Id. at 350. 
115. Id. at 351 (emphasis added). 
116. Id. at 352-53, n.4 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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increase her income “such as obtaining a second job of a menial nature 
which would fit within her self-imposed comfort level.”117 
While his dissent asserts a “clearly erroneous” standard of review, his 
detailed line-by-line budget analysis and dispute of the lower court’s 
findings demonstrate a de facto application of a much less deferential 
standard of review.118  It is difficult to conclude that he was doing 
anything other than reviewing the evidence as though he were the trial 
judge in the first instance and reaching a de novo conclusion about the 
relevance of the evidence presented. 
Ironically, while Judge Schermer may have been applying a more 
stringent standard in the Cline and Long dissents sub silentio, it turned out 
he was not wrong in applying a more inquisitive standard of review.  The 
creditor in the Long case appealed its BAP loss to the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, focusing this time on the standard of review.119  It pointed out 
that the Eighth Circuit had not yet adopted a standard of review in “undue 
hardship” appeals and the lower courts had therefore applied the highly 
deferential “clearly erroneous” standard.120  The creditor argued, and the 
Eighth Circuit agreed, it should adopt a more searching de novo review 
standard to bring it in line with the other circuits that had ruled on the 
issue.121  The Eighth Circuit panel found that “undue hardship” is a 
question of law: “It requires a conclusion regarding the legal effect of the 
[b]ankruptcy [c]ourt’s findings as to her circumstances.  Questions of law 
are reviewed de novo.”122 
The creditor also sought to convince the Eighth Circuit to join the other 
circuits in applying the more restrictive Brunner test for “undue hardship” 
rather than its own “totality of circumstances” test.123  This the Eighth 
Circuit declined to do, stating:   
 
We prefer a less restrictive approach . . . We are 
convinced that requiring our bankruptcy courts to adhere 
 
117. Id. at 353. 
118. Id. at 352-56. 
119. In re Long, 322 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir 2003) [hereinafter “Long I”]. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. (citing In re Papio Keno Club, Inc., 262 F.3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
123. Id. at 553-54. 
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to the strict parameters of a particular test would diminish 
the inherent discretion contained in [section] 523(a)(8)(B) 
. . . We believe that fairness and equity require each undue 
hardship case to be examined on the unique facts and 
circumstances that surround the particular bankruptcy.124   
 
As the BAP had applied the incorrect standard of review though, the 
Eighth Circuit remanded the case back to the BAP for review of the 
bankruptcy court’s ruling under a de novo standard.125 
Upon remand, the BAP hearing the case only retained one member 
from the previous panel, Barry Schermer.126  In his opinion for a 
unanimous court, Judge Schermer made searching use of the de novo 
review standard.127  He challenged the debtor’s decision to work only part-
time, reasoning that she “may incur additional child care expenses if she 
increased her work, but she has failed to demonstrate that the additional 
child care costs would exceed the additional income she could earn.”128  
He reasoned that, as the debtor was pursuing additional degrees, “her 
income potential should increase in the future.”129 Ultimately, Judge 
Schermer focused on the option to pursue an income-based repayment 
plan.130  He concluded that the debtor’s budget reflected sufficient leftover 
funds to be able to afford the $54.00 monthly payment, concluding that 
this amount was affordable and comparing the twenty-five-year repayment 
commitment to a standard thirty-year mortgage.131 
The reliance on income-based repayment plan options remains a 
cornerstone of Judge Schermer’s undue hardship jurisprudence. It is 
featured, for example, in his opinion for the BAP in the In re Parker 132 
case, where the lower court found that the debtor would have required 
payments of $152.00 monthly to service the debt and the reduced payment 
 
124. Id. at 554. 
125. Id. at 555. 
126. Long I, 271 B.R. 322; and In re Long, 292 B.R. 635 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter 
“Long II”]. 
127. Long II, 292 B.R.b at 639. 
128. Id. at 638. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 639. 
131. Id. at 639. 
132. 328 B.R. 548 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005). 
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plan would require payments of $136.33, even though the contractual 
monthly amount was $564.09. In response, Judge Schermer later argued: 
 
The debtor must establish undue or excessive hardship 
before a student loan may be discharged. If the budget 
demonstrates that a debtor can afford payments under the 
ICRP, continued liability on the student loan does not 
create an undue hardship . . . . [A]bsent compelling 
evidence to the contrary, a debtor’s ability to afford 
payments under the ICRP is determinative of the issue: 
continued liability for a student loan where a debtor can 
afford the payments does not create an undue hardship.133 
 
Other members of the BAP have been less willing to view the ability to 
afford a reduced payment plan as decisive.  As the Lee majority pointed 
out:  
 
Several bankruptcy courts have opined, and we agree, that 
the availability of the ICRP is "but one factor to be 
considered in determining undue hardship, but it is not 
determinative." Placing too much weight on the ICRP 
would have the effect in many cases of displacing the 
individualized determination of undue hardship mandated 
by Congress in [section] 523(a)(8) since the payments on a 
student loan will almost always be affordable, i.e., not 
impose an undue hardship on a [d]ebtor.134 
 
Initially, the Eighth Circuit seemed to be of different mind on the 
subject.  For example, in In re Reynolds, a divided panel concluded that a 
 
133. In re Lee, 352 B.R. 91, 97 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) (Schermer, J., concurring in result) 
(emphasis in original).  Nonetheless, it should be noted that Judge Schermer went on to conclude that, 
“this case is distinguishable from the many cases where I have concluded that the student loan did not 
create an undue hardship in one important aspect. In each of those cases, the debtor’s budget afforded 
the ability to make minimal payments toward the student loan debt under the ICRP. That is not the 
case in the present situation where the Debtor’s budget does not permit payment of the amount which 
would be due under the ICRP, nor does the Debtor face any prospect which would permit repayment 
in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 98. 
134. Id. at 95-96 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
FRIEDMAN/DAY ARTICLE  9/5/18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 55:13 
 
 
student loan could be an undue hardship where the mental health of the 
debtor was impacted by the burden of carrying large amounts of debt and 
the obligation to make payments.135  It granted the discharge despite the 
apparent ability to make a reduced monthly payment with the assistance of 
a spouse’s income.136 
Yet, a few years later, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals sounded a 
nearly-identical tone regarding the relevance of income-based repayment 
plan options in Educational Credit Management Corp. v. Jesperson.137  It 
said, 
 
the [lower courts] rejected reliance on the ICRP because 
"it does not offer a fresh start" and "might even be viewed 
as inimical to the goals of the fresh start because the ICRP 
allows for negative amortization of the student loan debt 
and a potentially significant tax bill if the student loan is 
ultimately forgiven after 25 years . . . .” We disagree. In 
[section] 523(a)(8), Congress carved an exception to the 
"fresh start" permitted by discharge for unpaid, federally 
subsidized student loans. If the debtor with the help of an 
ICRP program can make student loan repayments while 
still maintaining a minimal standard of living, the absence 
of a fresh start is not undue hardship.138 
 
It is important to note that the Jesperson court also stated that the income-
based plan options were “a factor” as opposed to determinative.139  Indeed, 
in concurrence, Judge Smith wrote separately “to emphasize that whether 
the debtor enrolled in the ICRP remains merely ‘a factor’ to consider when 
applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test.”140   
It is also instructive to note that Jesperson involved an attorney who 
had relatively substantial funds available to contribute to repayment 
(approximately $900 per month), while having made no prior effort to 
 
135. 425 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 2005). 
136. Id. at 532-33. 
137. 571 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2009). 
138. Id. at 782 (internal citations omitted). 
139. Id. at 781. 
140. Id. at 783. 
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repay and who demonstrated no meaningful impairment that would make 
it difficult to maintain employment.141  Indeed, the panel even went so far 
as to conclude the past history of non-payment was reflective of a lack of 
good faith in pursuing the undue hardship discharge at all, a factor that is 
more common to the Brunner test than the circuit’s own “totality of 
circumstances” test.142  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Over the past thirty years Judge Schermer’s impact on jurisprudence in 
the area of consumer bankruptcy law has been undeniable.  The sampling 
of issues presented in this Article demonstrates his critical impact on 
complex issues in an ever-changing niche within the bankruptcy field.  
The bankruptcy community in the Eastern District of Missouri is grateful 
for Judge Schermer’s dedication to consumer bankruptcy law and for 
providing new and seasoned lawyers with a guide for practice before his 
court. We look forward to Judge Schermer’s continued contributions to the 
legal community and wish him much success as he continues his tenure as 
a bankruptcy judge.  
 
 
141. Id. at 779. 
142. Compare Brunner v. New York Higher Educ. Svcs. 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir 1987), with 
Long, 322 F.3d at 554. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
